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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case arises out of a challenge to an informal adjudicative proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-15 allows dismissal of a suit challenging an informal
adjudicative proceeding for failure to prosecute the suit to final judgment within
certain time periods. Where an appeal has been taken, the statute provides a threeyear time period. Plaintiffs/appellants filed this action on December 15, 2006.
Although plaintiffs/appellants do not believe the limitations in § 73-3-15 apply in a
case involving an erroneous dismissal for lack of standing, out of an abundance of
caution they nevertheless respectfully request that these proceedings be expedited
so that, if the decision below is reversed, the case can be remanded to the district
court in time to conclude trial and obtain a final judgment before December 15,
2009.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves the legal requirements for standing in potential injury
cases. The Browns, Sorensons, and Mclntyre are neighbors living adjacent to
Little Cottonwood Creek in Murray, Utah. Mclntyre submitted an application to
the State Division of Water Rights for a permit to build a bridge across the creek.
The Browns and Sorensons (hereafter the "Neighbors") opposed the application
because the bridge would create a substantial risk of flooding and serious damage
to their properties in times of high water flow. The Division granted the permit
1

anyway. The Neighbors then filed suit in the Third District Court against Mclntyre
and the Division challenging the decision and seeking injunctive relief.
Mclntyre filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing which the district
court granted because, the court held, the Neighbors' alleged property injuries are
only potential harms that have yet to occur and may not occur in the future. The
court stated that "[i]f, down the road w construction of the bridge starts these
possible [flooding] events in action, Plaintiffs would then have standing to assert
their claims." See Addendum ("Add."), at 5, n.l (memorandum decision). Until
then, the district court held, the Neighbors lack standing. A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Neighbors' complaint failed to supply
proof that harm was impending or certain.
The majority decision below should be reversed because it misstates Utah
law and sets an improperly high threshold for standing in cases involving potential
injury to property. It is well established that risk of significant injury is sufficient
for standing and that a party facing such risk need not wait until the harm actually
occurs before seeking legal protection. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club
v. Utah Air Quality Bd. (? Sierra Club"), 2006 UT 74, ^ 29 ("If the emissions from
the proposed power plant have the potential to harm the health of those persons
who live in the area, we see no reason why those residents must actually develop a
health problem before they have standing.") (emphasis added). Granting standing
2

to those who face a real risk of harm to their properties from a neighbor's actions is
fully consistent with the separation-of-powers concerns animating this Court's
standing jurisprudence.

By contrast, the rule established below -requiring a

property owner to wait until the threatened harm becomes imminent or certain - is
without precedent in Utah law and makes little practical sense; indeed, it would
dramatically skew the law in favor of compensating completed harms over
preventing them in the first place.
The Neighbors ask nothing more than an opportunity to protect their
properties and homes by proving their claims in the ordinary course of litigation.
The majority decision below improperly denied them that opportunity.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction arises under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3) and
(5).
ISSUES PRESENTED
This Court's order of March 18, 2009 granted the Neighbors' petition for a
writ of certiorari on the following issue:
"Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred
in affirming the district court's dismissal based on lack of
standing."

3

This issue turns on two subsidiary issues:
1.

Whether persons facing potentially serious harm to their properties

and homes from a nearby property owner's actions have standing to sue to stop the
harm before it occurs or whether, as the decision below holds, they must wait until
the harm actually occurs or is imminent.
2.

Whether allegations in a complaint that a nearby property owner's

actions create a significant risk of serious property damage are sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Standard of Review. Whether a plaintiff has standing under an undisputed
set of facts is a question of law. The decision below affirming the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing is reviewed for correctness on
appeal. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 15; see also Stocks v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 2000 UT App 139, \ 9.
Preservation. These issues was the subject of Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss,
which the Neighbors opposed (R. 125-35), and of the decision below.
REPORT OF THE DECISION BELOW
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 195 P.3d 933, 2008 UT
App 353. The slip opinion ("Op.") is contained in the Addendum. See Add. at 10.

4

DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 provides that "any person aggrieved by an order
of the state engineer may obtain judicial review." Whether a person is "aggrieved"
is governed by traditional standing requirements.

Washington County Water

Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58,fflf11, 16.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,
Plaintiffs/appellants Lawrence and Marilyn Brown and Joseph and Kathleen

Sorenson (the "Neighbors") brought this action in Third District Court against
defendants/appellees State Engineer and Division of Water Rights of the Utah
State Department of Natural Resources (collectively the "Division") and realparty-in-interest James A. Mclntyre ("Mclntyre") challenging the granting of a
permit to build a bridge. A majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's dismissal for lack of standing.

This Court granted the

Neighbors' petition for a writ of certiorari on the standing issue.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
On August 21, 2006, Mclntyre filed an application with the Division to

construct a bridge across Little Cottonwood Creek. (R. 3, 10-12.) On September
20, 2006, the Neighbors submitted an Objection to Mclntyre's Application. (R. 3,
14-18.) The Division approved the Application on October 11, 2006. (R. 3, 38-

5

39.) On October 31, 2006, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 and Utah
Admin. Code § R655-6-17, the Neighbors filed a request for reconsideration (R. 4,
41-44), which the Division denied on November 17, 2006 (R. 4, 89).
On December 15, 2006, the Neighbors filed their "Petition for Judicial
Review of Informal Administrative Proceedings and Agency Action and
Complaint for Injunctive Relief ("complaint") in the Third District Court
challenging the Division's action. (R. 1; see also Add. at 22 (complaint).) The
complaint named the Division and Mclntyre as defendants. On January 29, 2007,
Mclntyre filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming the Neighbors lacked standing (R.
112, 143), which the Neighbors opposed (R. 125).
On March 22, 2007, the Neighbors learned that Mclntyre had commenced
construction activities on the bridge. (R. 166.) The next day, March 23, 2007, the
Neighbors filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (R. 159), which the district court denied after an informal in camera
hearing that same day (R. 212). The court made no findings of fact or conclusions
of law. {Id.)
On April 20, 2007, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision
granting Mclntyre's motion to dismiss. (R. 214-18.) On May 14, 2007, the district
court entered an order dismissing all claims based on its ruling that the Neighbors
lacked standing. (R. 220-21; see Add. at 7 (memorandum decision and order).)
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The Neighbors filed a timely appeal. (R. 236, 239.) On October 2, 2008, a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, Associate
Presiding Judge William A. Thorne, Jr. dissenting. (See Add. at 10.) On March
18, 2009, this Court granted the Neighbors' petition for a writ of certiorari.
C.

Statement of Facts.
Allegations in the Complaint.

The Neighbors' complaint alleges the

following well-pleaded facts, which are assumed true in this appeal from the grant
of a motion to dismiss. Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004
UT 27, t 5.
The Neighbors reside in Murray, Utah along Little Cottonwood Creek. (R.
2-3.) Their neighbor, Mclntyre, obtained a permit from the Division to build - and
eventually did build - a bridge across the creek. (R. 3.) The bridge spans an
environmentally fragile area that has already experienced significant flooding and
has a high risk of future flooding. (R. 3, 5.)
The bridge increases the existing flood risk and danger to the Neighbors'
properties and those of nearby landowners. (R. 5.) Specifically, the bridge and
associated access ramps will alter the channel of the stream and thereby (1)
diminish the natural channel's ability to conduct high water flows, (2) heighten the
potential for damming, and thus (3) increase the risk of flood-related damage in the
area where the Neighbors live. (R. 4-5.) In the event of flooding caused or
7

exacerbated by the bridge, the natural stream environment will be adversely
affected or destroyed. (R. 5.)
The Neighbors hired an engineering firm, Secor International ("Secor"), to
analyze the potential effects of building the bridge in its current location. (R. 5,
91.) The Secor Report of October 30, 2009, which was attached to the complaint,
finds that the approved bridge design provides for a one-foot clearance over a highwater mark of 526 cubic feet per second. (R. 5-6, 97; Add. at 40.) Water flows
have previously exceeded the bridge's one-foot clearance level. For example, on
June 1, 1984, the flow through the creek would have exceeded the bridge's height
by 70%, with a water depth of 6.58 feet and water flow of 898 cubic feet per
second. Such water levels would flow over and significantly increase the stress on
the bridge as approved and now built. (Id.)
The Secor Report also finds that if flows like those in 1984 occur in the
stream channel as altered by the bridge, the bridge could have a damming effect
that causes the stream banks to overflow and inundate the first-level flood plains
on both sides of the stream, causing significant erosion and damage to the
Neighbors' properties. (Id.) Because of the fragility of the land near the creek,
there has already been subsidence of the Neighbors' properties, which has caused
foundation and settling cracks in their homes. (R. 6.) The Neighbors allege that
the bridge will result in irreparable harm to their homes and properties. (Id.)
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Subsequent Construction of the Bridge. On March 22, 2007, despite ongoing litigation in the district court, Mclntyre began building his bridge. As noted,
the district court denied the Neighbors' motion for TRO. (R. 159, 212.) The
bridge has since been completed and the alleged risks are now literally set in
concrete. See Op., f 15 n.2.
D.

The Majority Opinion and Dissent Below.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals (Judge Judith M. Billings writing

for the majority) affirmed the ruling of the district court and held that the
Neighbors lack standing to bring their claims. The majority recited the "traditional
test" for standing, which "requires a plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable
injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." Op., f 6
(quoting Washington County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT, ^j 20) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the Neighbors had
made such a showing, the majority focused exclusively on the first part of the
three-part inquiry in Sierra Club, namely, whether the party has "assert[ed] that it
has been or will be adversely affected by the [challenged] actions." Sierra Club,
2006 UT 74, Tf 19 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Op., \ 7.
Drawing from federal standing cases, the majority then reformulated this test as an
examination of "whether Plaintiffs' interests are 4 ( a ) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Op., \ 8 (quoting
9

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The majority agreed that the Neighbors have alleged a particularized interest
satisfying the first requirement. It noted that the Neighbors "own property along
Little Cottonwood Creek where Mclntyre has built his bridge" and thus that
"[t]heir property is at risk if there is significant flooding of Little Cottonwood
Creek." Id \ 9.
As to whether the Neighbors' interests are "actual or imminent," the
majority acknowledged the established rule "that threatened rather than actual
injury can satisfy . . . standing requirements." Op., ^f 10 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). But ignoring Sierra Club's analysis of this issue, the majority
instead relied on federal civil rights cases for the notion that standing in potentialinjury cases requires "'an individualized showing that there is a very significant
possibility that the future harm will ensue.'" Op., f 10 (quoting Nelsen v. King
County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted;
emphasis omitted).
Reviewing the pleadings, the majority held that "[the] allegations [in the
complaint] do not rise to the level of demonstrating an actual or imminent injury to
Plaintiffs." Op., Tf 13. The majority faulted the Neighbors because, rather than
providing concrete proof, the complaint alleged "simply conclusory statements that
10

the bridge will alter Little Cottonwood Creek's natural stream flow and that
Plaintiffs will suffer harm if a flood occurs." Id. The problem, the majority said,
was that "[t]he complaint simply provides the Plaintiffs' opinions regarding their
fears and concerns of a potential future harm." Id,
We acknowledge that the complaint does assert some actual facts
suggesting that a flood or high water flows would cause harm to
Plaintiffs' property. . . . Indeed, the engineer's report attached to the
complaint shows a danger of possible damage to Plaintiffs' property if
Little Cottonwood Creek's water flows reach the same levels that they
did in 1984. However, the potential dangers are contingent on key,
unknown events - an increased water flow or a flood - which are
dictated by unknown weather patterns. Essentially, Plaintiffs' injury
depends on "4 contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.'"
Id. \ 14 (citations omitted).
The majority found the Neighbors' complaint deficient for "not ma[king]
any other allegations or offering] any other evidence that a similar flood is
immediate or at least certainly impending" and for not alleging "what work was
done to Little Cottonwood Creek after the 1984 flood to prevent future flooding in
the area." Id. f 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And despite
acknowledging that allegations in a complaint must be deemed true on a motion to
dismiss, "with any inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' claims" {id. % 5), the
majority found the Neighbors' allegations defective because they required the
court "to infer what events might transpire to cause [the Neighbors] harm in the
future." Id. ^ 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The majority
11

"concludefd]

that

although

Plaintiffs

have

demonstrated

an

individual,

particularized interest in the construction of Mclntyre's bridge, they have not
demonstrated that any potential injury to their property is actual or imminent. The
threat of any harm to their property is too speculative because it is contingent on
unknown future events." Id. \ 16 (emphasis added).
Judge Thorne dissented because the majority failed to accept the allegations
in the complaint as true, essentially adjudicating factual issues on a motion to
dismiss: "[S]tanding issues may present questions of fact that need to be resolved
through the ordinary adversarial process.

In this case, both the degree and

likelihood of harm alleged by Plaintiffs constitute such questions of fact." Id, \ 18
(citation and quotation marks omitted) (Thorne, J., dissenting).
[T]he only question we should be considering on appeal is whether
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges sufficient harm to confer standing, not
whether that harm actually exists. I believe that the complaint clearly
meets this requirement. The complaint alleges that Mclntyre's bridge
will cause "immediate and irreparable harm," "increase the risk of
flooding in the surrounding areas," and "cause significant erosion and
damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the
bridge" if that flooding occurs. Taking these allegations as true, there
is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs have alleged individualized
harm sufficient to confer standing in this matter.
Id. \ 20 (Thome, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Judge Thome emphasized that such allegations had yet to be proven, and
that the Neighbors would "still have to establish their alleged facts in order for the
district court to ultimately have jurisdiction to consider their complaint. But, that
12

is a matter for trial, or perhaps summary judgment."

Id. f 21 (Thorne, J.,

dissenting). The standing issue "should not have been resolved against Plaintiffs
upon a motion to dismiss." Id. (Thorne, J., dissenting). Judge Thorne concluded:
Mclntyre's bridge may or may not present the risk of harm alleged by
Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs did allege that the bridge will increase
the risk of significant damage to their property, and that is sufficient,
in my opinion, to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In
granting the motion, the district court improperly weighed the degree
of risk alleged by Plaintiffs when it should have simply accepted the
allegation of increased risk as true. In my opinion, this was error by
the district court, and I would reverse the dismissal order and remand
this matter for further proceedings.
Id. \ 22 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The law of standing exists to ensure that a plaintiff has a personal stake in
the litigation rather than a general or ideological grievance. The primary concern
is to avoid judicial conflict with the constitutionally-based policy-making powers
of the legislature and executive. Standing requirements weed out those who lack a
concrete interest in the case. But standing analysis is not intended to determine the
merits of a lawsuit - the threshold is low. Under this Court's jurisprudence, a party
has standing at the pleading stage if it (1) alleges that it has been or will be
adversely impacted by the challenged actions, (2) alleges a causal connection
between the injury, the challenged actions, and the relief requested in the lawsuit,
and (3) seeks relief that is substantially likely to redress the alleged injury. Sierra
Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 29.
13

The Neighbors easily meet these requirements. The complaint alleges that
Mclntyre's bridge directly endangers not generalized or public interests but the
Neighbors' own homes and properties. There is a close causal relationship
between those potential injuries, Defendants' actions, and the injunctive relief the
Neighbors seek. And the injunctive relief they seek would redress the threatened
injury. Nothing more is required.
The majority opinion errs in holding that the Neighbors were required to
demonstrate an "actual or imminent harm" to their properties to survive Mclntyre's
motion to dismiss. This was error on three grounds. Op., 1f 11. First, this Court
has held that even "potential" harm to person or property creates standing - a
plaintiff need not wait until the risk materializes before suing. Sierra Club, 2006
UT 74, ^f 29. Second, an increased risk of injury to person or property is itself an
actual harm for standing purposes. And third, at the pleading stage the Neighbors'
allegations that the bridge increases the risk of significant damage to their
properties are more than enough to establish standing.
None of which is to say that the Neighbors will ultimately prevail on the
merits. The strength of the Neighbors' claims is not at issue. The only question is
whether they have alleged a sufficient stake in the outcome to satisfy the low
threshold for standing. They plainly have.

14

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS ARE AGGRIEVED PARTIES WHO HAVE STANDING
TO BRING THIS ACTION.
A.

Standard of Review.

"Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law" and hence on appeal
the court "accord[s] no deference to the ruling of the trial court." Stocks, 2000 UT
App, \ 9 (quotation marks omitted); Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^f 15; Provo City
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). Additionally, this case was
dismissed on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 252 at 12-13.) On a motion to
dismiss, a court presumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).1
The same rule applies to the threshold issue of standing. "For purposes of ruling
on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts
must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth v. Seldin, Ml U.S. 490, 501
(1975). And a[b]ecause the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law,
[the appellate court] give[s] the trial court's ruling no deference and review[s] it
under a correctness standard." St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 196.

1

The court may also consider the materials that were attached to the complaint. See
Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertson's Inc., 2004 UT 101, If 10 ("The rules are clear that
documents attached to a complaint are incorporated into the pleadings for purposes of
judicial notice and are fair game for this court to consider in addition to the complaint's
averments.").
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The plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove standing, but "[a]t the pleading
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct
may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, [the court] presume[s] that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

It is enough at the pleading stage, for example, for the

plaintiffs to "allege[] that they could prove causation" (an element of standing) if
given the chance: "that is all that is required at this phase." Sierra Club, 2006 UT
74, Tj 32. Otherwise, a full investigation of causation on a motion to dismiss would
be necessary, which "would, in many cases, supplant the trial process on the merits
of the underlying claim." Id. In sum, this Court should accept as true the material
allegations in the complaint and construe them and all reasonable inferences in
favor of the Neighbors.
B.

General Standing Principles,

In contrast with Article III standing in federal courts, standing under Utah
law is not strictly a matter of jurisdiction but of prudence and judicial modesty.
"Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not

The plaintiffs burden increases "with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation," so that in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment, for example, a plaintiff could no longer rely on the pleadings. Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 561. But even at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff only has to establish that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether standing exists. See Central Delta
Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Steel Company
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998)).
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constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States
Constitution requiring 'cases' and 'controversies,'

since no similar requirement

exists in the Utah Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah
1983). The overarching concern guiding this Court's standing jurisprudence is "to
protect the separation of powers under the Utah Constitution." Sierra Club, 2006
UT74,fl2.
Standing is a concept "rooted in the historical and constitutional role
of the judiciary" as one of three separate and equal branches of
government. [Citation omitted.] Through our case law, we have
developed the requirement that a party have standing in order "to
confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation of powers,
and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are
most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process."
Id. % 11 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149). Standing doctrine helps ensure that
litigants do not use the judiciary to decide public policy issues that are the
constitutional prerogative of the political branches. Courts are best equipped to
address real disputes among real parties with a real stake in the outcome rather
than broad questions of policy. 3
Hence, this Court requires only that a plaintiff have a "personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. Adverse parties with
specific interests at stake ensure that the court has "a concrete factual context
This Court in Sierra Club underscored that separation-of-powers concerns lie at the
heart of the standing analysis when it repeatedly emphasized that granting standing to
two of the plaintiffs in that case would not encroach on the policy-making prerogatives of
the executive or legislature and would not open the court doors to those with merely
generalized grievances. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT,fflf11, 12, 17, 25, 26, 28.
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conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Id. at
1149 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "It is generally insufficient for a
plaintiff to assert only a general interest he shares in common with members of the
public at large."

Id. at 1148.

Such "generalized grievances . . . are more

appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state
government." Id.
To ensure that a plaintiff challenging the Division's approval of an
application has a personal stake in the outcome, Utah law limits appeals to those
who are "aggrieved" by an agency decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 ("any
person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review").
Whether a party is aggrieved involves the same analysis as the "traditional
standing requirement that a plaintiff show particularized injury."

Washington

County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT, Tf 1130. The traditional test has three
elements:
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be adversely
affected by the challenged actions. Second, the party must allege a
causal relationship between the injury to the party, the challenged
actions, and the relief requested. Third, the relief requested must be
substantially likely to redress the injury claimed. If the party can
satisfy these three criteria, the party has standing to pursue its claims
before the courts of this state.
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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C.

Sierra Club Establishes That Potential Harm to Person or
Property Gives Rise to Standing Under Utah Law,

This Court has already addressed standing in cases involving potential injury
to person or property. In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club sought judicial review of a
permit allowing a power company to build a coal-fired power plant in the vicinity
of the Colorado Plateau. 2006 UT 74, \ 2. To support its standing, the Sierra Club
submitted affidavits from three of its members. This Court held that two of the
three had standing. One, Mr. Cass, alleged that the plant's future emissions would
impair visibility (thus harming his videographer business), decrease the value of
his property, and impair his health. Id. f 4. The second, Ms. Roberts, alleged that
future emissions would contaminate the soil, damage the crops of her farm, and
affect her health and that of her children and neighbors. Id. % 5.
Although these alleged injuries were based on fears of potential future
effects, this Court had no trouble finding standing based on the fact that the alleged
injuries were particular to them rather than society at large:
Mr. Cass and Ms. Roberts have met the adverse effects requirement
because they either live or recreate, or both, near the site of the plant
and have alleged injuries particular to them, rather than expressing
generalized concerns about the plant's impact on the public at large.
Id. \ 28 (emphasis added). The fact the alleged injuries were merely potential
harms in no way undermined standing. This Court specifically concluded that Mr.
Cass's and Ms. Roberts's concerns about potential health risks were alone
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sufficient to confer standing - even before the harm actually developed or became
imminent and despite the fact that the alleged harm might never develop:
We reject the suggestion that a party must identify a risk to an existing
health condition in order to have standing. If the emissions from the
proposed power plant have the potential to harm the health of those
persons who live in the area, we see no reason why those residents
must actually develop a health problem before they have standing.
Id. % 29 (emphasis added). By contrast, the third Sierra Club member had alleged
only a generalized concern that was insufficient for standing: "Expressions of
concern, without a claim of actual or potential injury to the party, are too
generalized to qualify as a distinct and palpable injury under the traditional
criteria." Id. \ 27 (emphasis added).
The majority below failed to address Sierra Club's holding regarding
potential injury. The rule it established is erroneous because, contrary to Sierra
Club, it denies standing in potential injury cases.

It requires a plaintiff to

demonstrate an "actual or imminent" injury (Op., <[J 16 (emphasis added)) rather
than an "actual or potential injury." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, % 27 (emphasis
added). The majority below essentially redefines "potential" to mean "imminent,"
which is a much higher hurdle to overcome - at least as defined by the majority.
Applying this more onerous standard, the majority held that the Neighbors lack
standing despite acknowledging that "[i]t is clear from the complaint that [the
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Neighbors] have a personal interest in the dispute" because "[t]heir property is at
risk if there is significant flooding of Little Cottonwood Creek." Op., ^f 9.
If the majority's high threshold had been the standard in Sierra Club, this
Court would have been forced to deny standing because no one could show that an
unconstructed power plant - one that might not be built for years - threatened
"imminent" injuries to the health or property of specific individuals. Indeed, all
the alleged health injuries this Court found sufficient for standing were mere risks
(potential outcomes) that depended on unknown physiological reactions to various
types of emissions. There was no suggestion in Sierra Club that anyone alleged a
unique or documented health issue with the specific type of pollution the plant
would emit. In fact, this Court rejected such a requirement. Sierra Club, 2006 UT
74, | 29 ("We reject the suggestion that a party must identify a risk to an existing
health condition in order to have standing."). The plaintiffs alleged nothing more
than potential and basically unknowable future risks created by the proposed power
plant - there was never any assurance that the alleged future harms would occur.
Yet this Court had no hesitation finding standing for the two plaintiffs who had
alleged "potential harms" that were "particular to them." Id.ffif24, 28. Unlike the
majority below, this Court did not assess the seriousness of the risk or the
likelihood that potential harms might occur, implicitly recognizing that such
questions go to the merits of the case and not to standing.
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This Court should reject the rule established by the majority below because
it will result in dismissals based on standing in numerous cases seeking to prevent
potential harms. Those, like the Neighbors, with compelling personal reasons to
fear that nearby construction will result in serious damage to their properties in the
event of flooding, earthquake, mudslides, or other natural and largely unpredictable
phenomena will rarely be able to show that such risks are "imminent" - in the
sense of "about to occur" - before it is too late for legal action and their properties
are irreparably damaged or destroyed. Claims that a proposed building suffers
from structural defects that create risks of severe harm to neighbors' properties or
persons would be dismissed at the pleading stage without ever reaching the merits.
Potential environmental injuries - often based on projected health risks with
potentially serious but ultimately uncertain future effects - could never be litigated
before they materialized as specific injuries in specific individuals and thus were
too late to stop. The decision below fundamentally conflicts with this Court's
standing jurisprudence and sound judicial policy.
D.

Federal Courts Also Recognize Standing in Cases Involving
Merely Potential Harm,

The majority below essentially ignored Sierra Club and instead relied
heavily on what the court incorrectly understood to be federal standing law. See
Op-> 1Hf 8-10, 14-15. Although federal standing law is more restrictive than Utah
law because of Article III, federal courts have long held that a risk to health or
22

property is itself a type of actual injury sufficient to give rise to standing. "Courts
have . . . left no doubt that threatened injury . . . is by itself injury in fact." Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (potential
environmental injury); see also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546,
557 (5th Cir. 1996) ("That the injury is cast in terms of future impairment rather
than past impairment is of no moment.").

"Threats or increased risk thus

constitutes cognizable harm." Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160. The
Fourth Circuit noted that although such threats are "probabilistic," even so "other
circuits have had no trouble understanding the injurious nature of risk itself." Id.
The Ninth Circuit has likewise stated: "[Threatened injury constitutes injury in
fact." Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir.
2002).
Federal courts have also recognized that the likelihood of the potential injury
does not have to be great to confer standing under Article III.

In Natural

Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the D.C. Circuit
held that even a 1 in 200,000 risk that someone will develop nonfatal skin cancer
as a result of an EPA rule was sufficient injury-in-fact for standing. The court
acknowledged the same "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural5 or 'hypothetical'"
language relied on by the majority below in this case. Id. at 6 (quoting Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
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95, 101-02 (1983)); Op., Tf 10. But it explained that federal courts nevertheless
allow standing based on "probabilistic" health or property injuries if plaintiffs
"demonstrate a 'substantial probability' that they will be injured." 464 F.3d at 6
(citations omitted). The court held that a 1 in 200,000 risk was substantial enough.
Likewise, in Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.
1993), the Village brought suit to enjoin the Corps of Engineers from granting a
permit for construction of a radio tower in the floodplain of a nearby creek. The
Village asserted that the creek was "flood-prone" and that the tower would
increase the risk of flooding by limiting the creek's drainage area. The court held
this was a legally cognizable injury. "The injury is of course probabilistic, but
even a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy - to
take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical - provided, of course that the
relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability." Id. at 329 (citing Pennell
v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), and Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980))
(emphasis added).
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir.
1996), the court found standing based on a moderate increase in the risk of forest
fires due to a logging plan approved by the Forest Service. Standing is proper, the
court held, where the risk is "non-trivial" and "sufficient... to take a suit out of
the category of the hypothetical." Id. at 1234-35. The court observed that the
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increase in risk required for standing may be inversely proportional to the degree
of potential harm:
Of course for a probabilistic event such as a wildfire, almost any act
(other than, say, deliberate setting of a fire) merely affects
probabilities, but we do not understand the customary rejection of
"speculative" causal links as ruling out all probabilistic injuries. The
more drastic the injury that government action makes more likely, the
lesser the increment in probability necessary to establish standing. . . .
[T]he potential destruction of fire is so severe that relatively modest
increments in risk should qualify for standing.
Id. at 1234.
The United States Supreme Court recently cited Village of Elk Grove and
Mountain States Legal Foundation with approval in holding that the risks to a
state's sovereign territory of uncertain harms due to global warming can give rise
to standing. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1458 n.23
(2007). Earlier, the High Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), allowed a suit to go forward where
plaintiffs sued over approval of a new nuclear power plant. Part of their alleged
injuries was the risk of a nuclear accident. Rejecting the assertion that the claim
was not ripe (a closely related inquiry under Article III) because "no nuclear
accident has yet occurred," the Supreme Court held that the legal issues were
sufficiently concrete to be ready for decision. The Court recognized that "delayed
resolution of these issues would foreclose any relief from the present injury
suffered by appellees - relief that would be forthcoming if they were to prevail. . .
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." Id. at 82 (emphasis added). A nuclear meltdown does not have to be imminent
before a plaintiff can sue to prevent future harm.
The rule of these and other federal decisions overlooked by the court below
is that "the injurious nature of risk itself is an injury-in-fact for purposes of
standing in cases involving potential injury to person or property. Friends of the
Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160. Where that risk is non-trivial, standing is proper.
Federal decisions also recognize that proving the quantum of the increased
risk of harm goes to the merits of the claim and generally should not be addressed
as a matter of standing. In Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C. Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th
Cir. 2005), the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of a class of aas-of-yet uninjured"
individuals alleging that a medical device implanted during bypass surgery
increased the risk of aortic bypass stenosis. Id. at 570. The trial court held that the
alleged injury was "'purely hypothetical'" and thus denied standing. The Sixth
Circuit reversed: "'[Cjourts have long recognized that an increased risk of harm,
which the plaintiff alleges, is an injury-in-fact.'"

Id. at 573-74 (quoting In re

Propulsid Prod. Liability Litigation, 208 F.R.D. 133, 139 (E.D. La. 2002)). The
court held that it was improper to require the plaintiff to show as part of the
standing inquiry how significant the increased risk may be.

"[T]o require a

plaintiff to so clearly demonstrate her injury in order to confer standing is to
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prematurely evaluate the merits of her claims." Id. at 575. 4 Just like this Court in
Sierra Club, the Sutton court also recognized the value of allowing a plaintiff to
address a problem before the injury occurs: "[Tjhere is something to be said for
disease prevention, as opposed to disease treatment.

Waiting for a plaintiff to

suffer physical injury before allowing any redress whatsoever is both overly harsh
and economically inefficient." Id.; see Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 29 ("[W]e see
no reason why these residents must actually develop a health problem before they
have standing.").
In a related vein, because of the injurious nature of risk itself, proving the
inevitability and immediacy of the ultimate injury is not a prerequisite to standing.
In Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978), the court held that inmates
concerned about the risk of fire at a prison had standing. The court reasoned that
the defendant "inaptly construes the requirement of injury as requiring proof that
the inmates inevitably will suffer physical injury or death from fire before they
have standing to challenge the hazardous fire conditions . . . existing at [the
prison]."

On the contrary, the court held, "[o]ne need not wait for the

4

Consistent with federal decisions, this Court has recognized that the merits inquiry is
separate from the standing inquiry, and that it is neither "necessary [n]or appropriate for
us to consider the merits of the petitioners' claim in deciding whether they have
standing." Society ofProfessionalJournalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166,
1170 n.3 (Utah 1987); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (although standing
may exist in certain cases based solely on a statute creating a legal right, the invasion of
which creates standing, "standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs
contention that particular conduct is illegal").
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conflagration before concluding that a real and present threat exists." Id.at 18; see
also Sutton, 419 F.3d at 572 (plaintiff is not required to show "immediacy" of the
injury to have standing).
These federal decisions are consistent with this Court's holding in Sierra
Club and eminently sensible. The principle that risk of future harm to person or
property is itself injurious comports with common sense. An increased risk of
future damage to property - such as from an increased flood risk to a home necessarily decreases the current value of the property, increases th e costs of
insurance, creates costs to ameliorate the risk, and decreases the enjoyment of
ownership. These are real, not hypothetical, harms. If impairment of a person's
enjoyment of purely aesthetic things is enough for standing {Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)), the same must be true of acts that diminish the
physical integrity, value, safety, and enjoyment of one's own home.
The majority decision below creates needless conflict with federal decisions
recognizing "the injurious nature of risk itself." Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204
F.3d at 160.

It relies on inapplicable language from federal cases rejecting

speculative claims about future government infringement of personal or civil
rights, such as the unpublished decision in Resident Councils of Washington v.
Thompson, 2005 WL 1027123 (W.D. Wash.) {^'Resident Councils"). See Op., f
10.

In fact, the majority decision basically repeats the analysis in Resident
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Councils.

Plaintiffs there sought to prohibit the federal government "from

implementing regulations which would permit the use of paid feeding assistants in
nursing homes" because they believed the assistants lacked proper training. 2005
WL 1027123, p. * 1 . But it was entirely "speculative" whether any of the
individual plaintiffs would ever be affected by the regulations. Id. at p. *4. Four
of the five individual plaintiffs didn't require feeding assistance and might never in
the future.

The fifth required such assistance but her condition made her

"ineligible for feeding assistant aid" under the challenged regulations. Id. at p. *4.
Lacking even a present risk of harm, the court denied standing.
The other cases the opinion quotes involved civil rights claims based on
flimsy speculation about future government infringements or claims based on
legislation that had yet to pass. 5 None of these cases involved an actual, present

5

See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (denying standing for
equitable relief based on speculative fears that police would use illegal chokehold during
potential future stop for traffic violation or other offense; "The plaintiff must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Nelsen
v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying standing in civil rights case
against alcohol treatment center by former residents because "the threat of future harm to
[plaintiffs] is based upon an extended chain of highly speculative contingencies,"
including that plaintiffs would again become indigent alcohol abusers); J. Roderick
MacArthur Found v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying standing to sue
FBI for mere retention of information files on plaintiffs because "speculative at best55 that
any injury would occur; "Such 'someday5 injuries are insufficient.55); Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (third party lacks standing to challenge death sentence
imposed on capital defendant who waived appeal rights where alleged interest is third
party's desire that criminal database be complete for purposes of evaluating his own
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risk of injury such as exists here. The foregoing review demonstrates that even
under Article IIFs more restrictive standing requirements numerous federal
decisions have found standing based on potential injury to person or property. The
opinion below sets too high a hurdle for standing based on a misreading of federal
case law.
E.

The Complaint Establishes the Neighbors9 Standing.

The complaint alleges all that is necessary under the traditional test to
establish standing at the pleading stage: the Neighbors allege that (1) they "ha[ve]
been or will be adversely affected by the challenged actions"; (2) there exists "a
causal relationship between the injury to [them], the challenged actions, and the
relief requested"; and (3) "the relief requested [is] substantially likely to redress the
injury claimed." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 19 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
1.

The Neighbors have alleged particularized injuries.

The complaint alleges specific potential harms to the Neighbors' properties.
It claims that the permit authorizes construction of a bridge that will reduce the
capital crime in potential future sentencing proceedings); LP A Inc. v. Chao, 211
F.Supp.2d 160 (D.D.C. 2002) (no standing because no state has enacted the challenged
legislation; "[T]he injury plaintiffs seek to avoid is too speculative to satisfy the standing
requirements.'5); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568,
580 (1985) (ripeness decision: challenge to constitutionality of federal arbitration
requirement ripe because plaintiff "has been or inevitably will be subjected to" the
requirement). The majority cites all of these cases in paragraphs 10 and 14-15 of the
decision below.
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natural stream channel's ability to conduct high water flows, heighten the potential
for damming, and thus increase the risk of significant flood-related damage to the
Neighbors' properties. (R. 4-5.) In the event of flooding caused or exacerbated by
the bridge, the Neighbors allege that the natural stream environment will be
adversely affected and potentially destroyed. (R. 5.)
In a preliminary analysis, the Secor Report of September 18, 2006 (also
attached to the complaint) provided context for these allegations:
Building the proposed bridge . . . could create a channel constriction a point in the channel which would, under high flow conditions,
provid[e] an opportunity for typical debris, vegetation/trees, rocks,
and any other urban materials to catch, backing up water. If the
stream flow is backed up, inundation of the 1 st level flood plane on
both sides of the stream channel is at significant risk.

The Brown Residence is located on the river terrace, directly above
the escarpment along the west side of the Creek. With the instabilities
observed in and around the escarpment, as well as the settlement
cracks (Photos 7 and 8), further erosion at the escarpment may
increase the risks for significant property damage. As proposed,
construction of the bridge could increase the potential for further
escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the potential for significant
property damage or worse.
(R. 67 (emphasis added); Add. at 32.)
Currently, a steep, exposed hill, devoid of plant growth, grass or any
foliation, lies directly to the east between the Browns' home and the Creek. That
escarpment provides lateral support to the Browns' home. Over time, erosion has

31

worn away the hill exposing alluvial soils at its base to the ever-running flow of the
creek. (R. 25.) The escarpment is the west bank of the creek, just down grade
from the proposed bridge and thus would be directly affected by any flooding.
Erosion to the escarpment has already caused significant settlement and signs of
collapse on the Browns' property and in their home. (R. 6, 67.) As explained by
Secor, accelerated erosion resulting from flooding on the first-level flood plane
caused by the flow restriction of the proposed bridge will result in additional
settlement, collapse, and ultimately the destruction of the Browns' property. (R. 6,
17, 67.) The Sorenson property is also situated above and adjacent to property
lying directly in the first level flood plain. Damage to that property will undermine
the lateral support to the Sorenson property.
In sum, flooding of the creek will impair the integrity of the ground
supporting the Neighbors' homes. The bridge directly increases the risk of such
flooding and thus of "significant property damage or worse." (R. 67.)
These allegations are more than enough to establish standing. Like the two
plaintiffs in Sierra Club, the Neighbors have "allege[d] that [they have] 'suffered
or will suffer[] some distinct and palpable injury that gives [them] a personal stake
in the outcome of [this] legal dispute.'" Id. \ 19 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at
1148). Like the plaintiffs in Sierra Club, the Neighbors have a "personal stake in
the outcome of the dispute" even though they face "potential harms" and "potential
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injuries" rather than completed harms. Id.fflf23, 24, 26, 27, 29. Like the plaintiffs
in Sierra Club, the Neighbors "are alleging private, rather than public, injuries."
Id. f 24. And as in Sierra Club, the Neighbors "have a direct interest in the dispute
as their . . . property values are at stake." Id. \ 26. Judge Thorne accurately
observed that "[the Neighbors] did allege that the bridge will increase the risk of
significant damage to their property, and that is sufficient . . . to survive a motion
to dismiss for lack of standing." Op., ^J 22 (Thorne, J., dissenting).
Moreover, this case presents "no concern about courts . . . resolving
questions that are best left to the other branches of government." Sierra Club,
2006 UT 74, \ 26. The Neighbors are not "expressing generalized concerns about
the [bridge's] impact on the public at large." Id. ]f 28. They do not seek to use the
courts to wage a "political or ideological dispute[] about the performance of
government." Id. \ 17. Nor are they "roving environmental ombudsm[e]n seeking
to right environmental wrongs wherever [t]he[y] find them," but rather are "real
person[s] who own[] real homefs] . . . in close proximity" to Little Cottonwood
Creek and the proposed bridge. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 157. They
seek only to protect their homes and properties by judicial application of existing
law to the specific facts of this case. A more traditional and appropriate context
for invoking the jurisdiction of the courts is hard to imagine.
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The alternative to granting standing here is the rule Mclntyre advocated,
which the district court adopted and the majority below affirmed. At the hearing
on the Motion to Dismiss, the following exchange took place between the district
court and Mclntyre:
THE COURT: Assuming I grant your motion to dismiss and
then the worst fears are realized that you put the bridge in, it's causing
stoppage. You cannot clear it out. It's caused the erosion, and it's
caused the erosion to the effect of the Brown[s] and the Sorenson[s]
are directly aggrieved on it, what happens at that point.

MR. MCINTYRE: I think they have, at that point, the right to
- they're not precluded from a right to file an action for injunction.
But what does it have to do with the state's engineer - engineer's
decision to put - or allow the bridge to be put in.

THE COURT: Yeah. But what I'm saying is, that it would be
two separate issues in my mind. That if the worse fears are realized MR. MCINTYRE: Right.
THE COURT: — after you['re] dismissed out of the case, then
they're not barred by filing another lawsuit asking that bridge to be
removed?
MR. MCINTYRE: Oh, absolutely not. Why would it be?
THE COURT: Okay.
(R. 252 at 12-13.)
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In this understanding, potential plaintiffs must sit back and wait until the
worst-case scenario is impending before they can petition the courts to protect
them and their properties. That is not Utah law. Under all relevant precedent, the
Neighbors have alleged a particularized injury.
2.

The Complaint alleges causation.

In Sierra Club, this Court had no difficulty finding sufficient allegations of
causation: "Because the Executive Secretary [was] responsible for denying or
granting permits for the construction and operation of the plant," this Court
reasoned, "his decision to grant the order is directly connected to the construction
and operation of the plant and to any resulting harms." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f
32. And "[r]ather than raising general allegations that the mere presence of a coalfired power plant will cause the alleged harms, the affidavits point to specific
aspects of the plant that will cause specific harms." Id, The same is true here. The
Neighbors' injuries are directly caused by the Division's approval of the permit to
build the bridge. And the Neighbors have pointed to specific aspects of the bridge
that will cause specific harms. The causation element of the test is not in dispute.
3,

The relief the Neighbors seek would redress their injuries.

Lastly, the Neighbors' injuries are redressable, just like the injuries in Sierra
Club:
[T]he Board has the power to redress the [plaintiffs'] injuries.
Through the Sierra Club, the [plaintiffs] have requested that the Board
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declare the air emissions permit illegal, revoke the order, and remand
the matter to the Division of Air Quality for further analysis. Because
the Board is the only party with the authority to grant this relief, it has
the power to redress the Sierra Club's injury by declaring the permit
illegal or at least referring the permit to the Division of Air Quality for
further analysis to ensure that the Executive Secretary's order
authorizing the plant's operation complies with state and federal law.
Id.\ 33.
Again, the same holds here. The Division has the authority to revoke the
permit granted Mclntyre and the district court has the authority to grant the
equitable relief the Neighbors seek should they prevail on their claims. Such relief
would immediately redress the injuries the Neighbors have alleged. Those injuries
- the potential harm and increased risk caused by the bridge - are directly tied to
the approval and construction of the bridge.
II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION IS CONTRARY TO BEDROCK LAW
GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS.
Judge Thome's dissent convincingly demonstrates that the majority opinion

conflicts with basic standards of notice pleading and the legal assumption that
factual allegations in the complaint are assumed true on a motion to dismiss. See
Op., W 18-22 (Thome, J., dissenting). Like the trial court before it, the majority
essentially weighed the "evidence" in the complaint and then faulted the Neighbors
for pleading "conclusory statements" {id. f 13), for not providing "evidence that a
similar flood is immediate" or impending, and for not supplying facts about "what
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work was done to Little Cottonwood Creek [since 1984] to prevent future
flooding." Id % 15.
Of course, the Neighbors never had an opportunity to present such evidence,
and none of this is remotely necessary to plead standing. "[U]nder Utah's liberal
notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient
to give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Power & Light, 969
P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). These minimal requirements apply when pleading
standing. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^f 32 (allegations of standing are "all that
is required at this phase"). And "for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss,
the facts alleged in the complaint are to be considered as true, with any inferences
drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' claims." Haymond, 2004 UT 27, \ 5. Thus, "[a]t
the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct may suffice [to establish standing]." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
As Judge Thorne correctly summarized, the Neighbors' allegations were
more than sufficient under these standards:
The complaint alleges that Mclntyre's bridge will cause "immediate
and irreparable harm," "increase the risk of flooding in the
surrounding areas," and "cause significant erosion and damage to the
Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge" if that
flooding occurs. Taking these allegations as true, there is no doubt in
my mind that Plaintiffs have alleged individualized harm sufficient to
confer standing in this matter.
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Op., 120 (Thome, J., dissenting). To be sure, as Judge Thome observed, "both the
degree and likelihood of harm alleged by [the Neighbors] constitute . . . questions
of fact." Id. f 19 (Thome, J., dissenting). "Plaintiffs still have to establish their
alleged facts in order for the district court to ultimately have jurisdiction to
consider their complaint.

But, that is a matter for trial, or pe rhaps summary

judgment," and not for a motion to dismiss. Id. \2\

(Thome, J., dissenting). The

majority opinion "improperly weighed the degree of risk alleged by [the
Neighbors] when it should have simply accepted the allegation of increased risk as
true." Id. % 22 (Thome, J., dissenting). Judge Thome was exactly right.
Hence, in addition to misstating and misapplying the test for standing, the
decision below is contrary to basic principles governing the pleading of standing
and the adjudication of motions to dismiss. The majority opinion would result in
the improper dismissal of numerous lawsuits for failure to plead standing with
great specificity.
CONCLUSION
On June 5, 1976, the Teton Dam burst, resulting in 11 deaths, more than
$300 million in damages, and the entire destruction of small towns.6 The odds of
such a catastrophe were so slim that there was really no opposition to the project.

6

See Teton Dam, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia at
http://en.wikipedia.Org/w/index.php?title=::Teton_Dam&oldid^285094438 (last visited
May, 4, 2009).
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Even as water started seeping through the dam, Bureau of Reclamation engineers
overseeing the project saw no real threat and did not warn homeowners along the
Snake River. Under the rule adopted by the majority below, homeowners living in
the shadow of the Teton Dam would not have had legal standing to challenge its
construction.

The mere risk that the dam would break would not be enough.

Standing would arise only when the deluge was imminent or certain, and a lawsuit
too late to prevent disaster. That is not Utah law - nor should it be.
This Court should reverse the majority decision below and remand the case
for further proceedings on the merits.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The Neighbors hereby request oral argument because it will materially assist
this Court in resolving the issues in this case.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2009.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Alexander Dushku
Peter C. Schofield
Justin W Starr
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs
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I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE BROWN, MARILYN BROWN,
JOSEPH SORENSON AND KATHLEEN
SORENSON, i n d i v i d u a l s ,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 060920127

vs.

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
JERRY OLDS in his capacity as
the Utah State Engineer, and
JAMES A. McINTYRE, an
individual,

April 16, 2002llP.rfc ^_
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

'eputy Clerk

Defendants/Respondents.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant James A. Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss.

The Court

heard oral argument with respect to the motion on April 16, 2007.
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
Plaintiffs and Defendant James A. Mclntyre ("Mclntyre") all
reside in an area adjacent to Little Cottonwood Creek located in
Murray, Utah.

Mclntyre desires to construct a bridge from one

side of Little Cottonwood Creek to the other.

On August 21,

2006, Mclntyre submitted an application with the Division of
Water Rights of the Utah State Department of Natural Resources

BROWN v. DIVISION

Page 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

("the Division7') for the construction of the bridge.

Plaintiffs

opposed the construction before the Division arguing such would
cause significant damage to their property.

The Division

ultimately granted Mclntyre's application for a Stream Channel
Alteration Permit and Plaintiffs initiated this action.
In support of his motion Mclntyre asserts Plaintiffs are not
aggrieved" persons" andTTxave~no~standxng~~to~se^k-judicial review—e£
the administrative agency's action.

Indeed, asserts Mclntyre,

unlike the process by which comments are accepted from persons
who may be interested in a project, the right to seek judicial
review is limited to those individuals who can "show some
distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake
in the outcome of the dispute."
Dist.

v. Morgan,

Conservation
(Utah 1993).

Ass'n

Wash.

County

2003 UT 58 f 20 {quoting
v. Board

of

State

Lands,

Water

Nat'l

Parks

Conservancy
&

869 P. 2d 909, 913

In the instant, argues Mclntyre, Plaintiffs only

argue that significant damage and injury to their property will
result.
While Mclntyre admits that the Secor

Report,

attached

to

the

Complaint, does note some erosion problems for the escarpment on
the creek's west bank, this is irrelevant, argues Defendant, as
that escarpment property does not belong to Plaintiffs or
Mclntyre, but to Jan Glines-Calder
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Further, asserts Mclntyre,
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that damage has nothing to do with the bridge, but rather, the
fact that the western side of the bank has not been armored.
Additionally, argues Mclntyre, as to their claim for
injunctive relief, such should be dismissed as Plaintiffs have
failed to allege facts necessary to support their claim.
Specifically, asserts Mclntyre, Plaintiffs have only alleged that
there is evidence of subsidence and cracking and that has
occurred without the bridge.

Moreover, contends Mclntyre, he

agrees that if the bridge causes damage to Plaintiffs7 property
he may be liable, accordingly, the harm is not irreparable.
Further, argues Mclntyre, Plaintiffs have failed to describe
a particular injury they will suffer, how an injunction would not
be adverse to public interest, or that they have a substantial
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing, as set forth in the
case of Bonham v. Morgan,

788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989), any uperson

aggrieved," not just a water user or person whose property lies
on the banks of a creek, may seek review of State Engineer action
pursuant to a proposed change application.
Like the plaintiffs in Bonham,

See Id.

at 498.

assert Plaintiffs, they have

alleged that significant damage to their property will result
from the construction of the proposed bridge.

Moreover, contend

Plaintiffs, the engineering reports attached as exhibits to
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Plaintiff's Complaint plainly set forth the potential damage that
Plaintiffs may incur should the proposed bridge be constructed.
With respect to Mclntyre's arguments regarding injunctive
relief, Plaintiffs assert they do not at this time seek either a
Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction.

Rather,

assert Plaintiffs, they request that the Court grant permanent
injunctive relief as a remedy due to the damage that will be
sustained should the proposed bridge be constructed.

Through the

course of this proceeding, contend Plaintiffs, they will
demonstrate their entitlement to equitable relief in the form of
a permanent injunction, as the potential damages they wrill suffer
if the bridge is constructed will be irreparable and legal
remedies are inadequate.
To establish standing under the statute, a person must
demonstrate they have suffered or* would suffer a distinct and
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the
outcome.

In the instant then, the Court must ask how far should

is the "would suffer" be stretched?

Indeed, while the

engineering reports do indicate that

w

[i]f the stream flow is

backed up, inundation of the 1st level flood plane on both sides
of the stream channel is at significant risk," and further that,
"construction of the bridge could increase the potential for
further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the potential
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for significant property damage or worse," the question is, does
this establish standing?

While the report set outs potential

problems that could occur if certain events come to fruition, the
Court is persuaded such requires great speculation to find it
demonstrates an outcome which uwould" occur.

Accordingly,

dismissal as requested is appropriate and, consequently,
granted.l
DATED this

x

day of April, 2007.

If, down the road construction of the bridge starts these
possible events in action, Plaintiffs would then have standing to
assert their claims.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE BROWN, MARILYN BROWN,
JOSEPH SORENSON, and KATHLEEN
SORENSON, individuals,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki

v.
THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
JERRY D. OLDS, in his capacity as the Utah
State Engineer, and JAMES A. McINTYRE,
an individual,

Civil No. 060920127

Respondents/Defendants.

Based upon the Memorandum Decision issued by the Court on April 20, 2007, granting
Defendant James A. Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss Petitioners' Petition and Complaint, and
based upon the Court's finding that Petitioners/Plaintiffs lack standing in this matter, it is hereby

ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this action, including all claims alleged
herein, is hereby dismissed.
DATED this / /

day of May, 2007.
BY THE COURT:
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Plaintiffs and Appellants,
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Division of Water Rights of
Department of Natural
Resources; Jerry D. Olds, in
his capacity as the Utah State
Engineer; and James A*
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Defendants and Appellees.
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Attorneys: Alexander Dushku, Benson L. Hathaway, Peter C.
Schofield, and Justin W. Starr, Salt Lake City, for
Appellants
Sarah E. Viola, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Mclntyre

Before Judges Thorne. Billings, and Davis.
BILLINGS, Judge:
^[l
Plaintiffs Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Brown, Joseph Sorenson,
and Kathleen Sorenson appeal the trial court's order dismissing
their case against Defendants James A. Mclntyre, the Division of
Water Rights of the Department of Natural Resources (the
Division) , and Jerry D. Olds in his capacity as the Utah State
Engineer, for lack of standing. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
\2
Plaintiffs and Mclntyre are neighbors with property along
Little Cottonwood Creek. Mclntyre has property located on both
sides of Little Cottonwood Creek. In August 2006, Mclntyre filed
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an application with the Division to construct a bridge across the
creek to connect the two parts of his property. Plaintiffs
submitted an objection to Mclntyre's application in September
2006. In October 2006, the Division approved Mclntyre's
application; Plaintiffs subsequently submitted a request for
reconsideration of the Division's approval. The Division denied
the request for reconsideration in November 2006.
K3
On December 15, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for
Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Proceedings and Agency
Action and Complaint for Injunctive Relief (the Complaint) in the
Third District Court, challenging the Division 1 s grant of
Mclntyre's application. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that
the bridge Mclntyre proposed to build would "alter [Little
Cottonwood Creek ! s] channel, and thereby diminish the natural
channel [']s ability to conduct high water flows, heighten the
potential for damming, and thus increase the risk of flooding"
and the damage caused by flooding in the area where Plaintiffs
reside. Plaintiffs claimed that the location of the bridge was
"in an area of high flood risk" and that "in the event flooding
occur [red] due in whole or in part to the construction of the
proposed bridge, the natural [creek] environment [would] be
adversely affected and potentially destroyed by the invading
flood waters."
^4
In response to the Complaint, Mclntyre filed a Motion to
Dismiss, claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing. While
Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss was pending, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. The trial court denied that motion in March 2007.
In April 2007, the trial court granted Mclntyre's Motion to
Dismiss. Plaintiffs now appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
^5
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when
it granted Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing.
11
[T] he question of whether a given individual . . . has standing
to request a particular [form of] relief is primarily a question
of law . . . . " Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Morgan, 2003 UT 58, H 18, 82 P.3d 1125 (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, "for
purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in
the complaint are to be considered as true, with any inferences
drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' claims." Haymond v. Bonneville
Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ] 5, 89 P.3d 171.
However, in this case we look at more than just the statements
and allegations made in the complaint because Plaintiffs attached
an engineer's report to their complaint. Therefore, we
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acknowledge that "there may be factual findings that bear on the
issue [of standing] , " and we review those factual findings "with
deference." Berg- v. State, 2004 UT App 337, % 5, 100 P. 3d 261
(internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
^6
Under Utah law, a plaintiff "must have standing to invoke
the jurisdiction of the court." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,
1148 (Utah 1983). "[T]he first and most widely employed standard
for establishing standing" is also referred to as the
"traditional test for standing." Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 20
(internal quotation marks omitted). This test "'requires a
plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable injury that gives
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.'" Id.
(quoting National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State
Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)).
%1
We use a three-part inquiry to determine whether a party has
suffered such a distinct and palpable injury:
First, the party must assert that it has been
or will be "adversely affected by the
[challenged] actions." Second, the party
must allege a causal relationship "between
the injury to the party, the [challenged]
actions and the relief requested." Third,
the relief requested must be "substantially
likely to redress the injury claimed."
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 2006 UT
74, U 19/ 148 P.3d 960 (alterations in original) (quoting
Jenkins, SIS P.2d at 1149-50). If a party can satisfy all three
parts of this inquiry, then it has standing to pursue its claims.
See id.
1)8
We begin by addressing the first part of this three-part
inquiry--whether Plaintiffs have been or will be adversely
affected by Mclntyre ! s bridge. To make this determination, we
examine whether Plaintiffs' interests are "(a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)/ see also Sierra Club,
2006 UT 74, % 20 (noting that the plaintiff must have "'a real
and personal interest in the dispute 1 " (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d
at 1150)) .
\9
The United States Supreme Court has noted that a
particularized injury is one that "affect[s] the plaintiff in a

20070474-CA

Add-12

personal and individual way." Luian, 584 U.S. at 560, n.l. It
is clear from the complaint that Plaintiffs in this case have a
personal interest in the dispute. They own property along Little
Cottonwood Creek where Mclntyre has built his bridge. Their
property is at risk if there is significant flooding of Little
Cottonwood Creek. Thus, Plaintiffs have a personal interest in
the construction of Mclntyrefs bridge.
^[10 The requirement that the injury be actual or imminent is
more troublesome. "The 'Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy
, . . standing requirements.1" Harris v. Board of Supervisors,
366 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th
Cir. 2000) (en banc)). However, "when standing is based upon the
threat of future injury, a plaintiff must show that the threat of
injury is both real and immediate, not conjectural or
hypothetical." Resident Councils of Wash, v. Thompson, No. C041691Z, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33630, at *11 (D. Wash. May 2, 2005)
(citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
There is no specific formula for determining when a future threat
of injury qualifies as real or immediate. See id. Such a
determination is individual and must be determined on a case-bycase basis. See Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th
Cir. 1990) . However, "what a plaintiff must show is not a
probabilistic estimate that the general circumstances to which
the plaintiff is subject may produce future harm, but rather an
individualized showing that there is a very significant
possibility that the future harm will ensue." Id. at 1250
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ull
In determining whether Plaintiffs have suffered an actual
or imminent harm, we review both Plaintiffs1 complaint and the
attached engineer's report. In Berg v. State, 20 04 UT App 33 7,
100 P.3d 261, this court recognized a need to review "factual
findings that bear on the issue [of standingj ." Id. | 5. In
Berg, the State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
See id. f 3. Attached to the motion was a sworn affidavit from
the Utah Attorney General stating specific facts regarding the
standing issue. See id. The affidavit was reviewed by both the
trial court and the appellate court in determining that the
plaintiff did not have standing. See id. H 4, 10. Similarly,
we also review certain facts that bear on the standing issue in
this case.
Hl2 We conclude that Plaintiffs' claim is too speculative to
amount to an actual or imminent injury. Plaintiffs' complaint
makes the following allegations:
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19. The approved bridge will . . . diminish
the stream[!]s ability to conduct high water
flows and thereby increase risk and danger of
flooding, and in the event flooding occurs,
the surrounding stream environment will be
unnecessarily and adversely affected.
20. Construction of the proposed bridge and
access ramps will alter the streams channel,
and thereby diminish the natural channel [ls]
ability to conduct high water flows, heighten
the potential for damming, and thereby
increase the risk of flooding in the
surrounding areas.
21. As observed in the Spring of 1984, the
location of the bridge is already in an area
of high flood risk. The approved bridge, if
constructed, will only enhance the already
high flood risk and danger to . . .
Plaintiffs1 . . . properties.
22. In the event flooding occurs due in
whole or in part to the construction of the
proposed bridge, the natural stream
environment will be adversely affected and
potentially destroyed by the invading flood
waters.

24. The [engineer's report] demonstrates
that . . . [w]ater flow like that experienced
in 1984 would flow over, and significantly
increase the stress on, the bridge as
approved.
25. The [engineer's report] . . .
demonstrates that if flows similar to those
in 1984 are experienced in the stream channel
. . . the erosion could cause the stream
banks to overflow and inundate the first
level flood plains on both sides of the
stream in the vicinity of the bridge. Such
an event will cause significant erosion and
damage to . . . Plaintiffs[' property].

20070474-CA
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28. Plaintiffs have already observed
subsidence of their property in areas close
to . . . Little Cottonwood Creek.
29. Additionally, Plaintiffs have observed
foundation and settling cracks on structures
.located on the property as a result of the
subsidence of the areas near . . . Little
Cottonwood Creek.
30. The construction of a bridge in this
environmentally fragile area will result in
irreparable harm and damage to . . .
Plaintiffs and their property.
1|l3 These allegations do not rise to the level of demonstrating
an actual or imminent injury to Plaintiffs. The majority of the
allegations are simply conclusory statements that thfe bridge will
alter Little Cottonwood Creek's natural stream flow and that
Plaintiffs will suffer harm if a flood occurs. The complaint
simply provides the Plaintiffs' opinions regarding their fears
and concerns of a potential future harm.
1|l4 We acknowledge that the complaint does assert some actual
facts suggesting that a flood or high water flows would cause
harm to Plaintiffs' property. These facts are•supported by the
engineer's report and are focused on the Little Cottonwood Creek
flooding that occurred in 1984. Indeed, the engineer's report
attached to the complaint shows a danger of possible damage to
Plaintiffs1 property if Little Cottonwood Creek's water flows
reach the same levels that they did in 1984. However, the
potential dangers are contingent on key, unknown events—an
increased water flow or a flood--which are dictated by unknown
weather patterns. Essentially, Plaintiffs' injury depends on
"'contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or
indeed may not occur at all.'" Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (quoting 13A Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3532 (2d ed.
1984)J.1 As the District of Columbia Circuit held, "[i]t is not
1. We recognize that Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products, Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985), discusses the
requirements for a ripeness challenge. However, "[a ripeness]
argument could easily be reformulated in terras of standing. . . .
'The doctrines of standing and ripeness are closely related, and
in [some] cases
. . . overlap entirely.'" Lane v. Stephenson,
No. 96-C-5565, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18346, at *8 n.4 (N.D. 111.
Dec. 9, 1996) (second alteration and second omission in original)
(continued...)
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enough . . . to assert that [the plaintiff] might suffer an
injury in the future, or even that [the plaintiff] is likely to
suffer an injury at some unknown future time. Such 'someday1
injuries are insufficient." J. Roderick MacArthur Found, v. FBI,
102 F.3d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Kl5 Plaintiffs' complaint provides evidence of Little Cottonwood
Creek flooding in 1984. However, the 1984 flood is the only
specific evidence of flooding that Plaintiffs allege. That flood
occurred over twenty years ago. Plaintiffs have not made any
other allegations or offered any other evidence that a similar
flood is immediate or at least "certainly impending," see
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) . Further, it is
unknown what work was done to Little Cottonwood Creek after the
1984 flood to prevent future flooding in the area. Because
Plaintiffs' injuries require this court "to infer what events
might transpire to cause [Plaintiffs] harm in the future, the
[standing] requirement [s are] not met." LPA Inc. v. Chao, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2002). 2
CONCLUSION
tl6 We conclude that although Plaintiffs have demonstrated an
individual, particularized interest in the construction of
Mclntyre's bridge, they have not demonstrated that any potential
injury to their property is actual or imminent. The threat of
1.
(...continued)
(quoting Smith v. Wisconsin Dept. of Aqrric, 23 F.3d 1134, 1141
(7th Cir. 1994)) .
2. Defendants argue on appeal that Plaintiffs' claim for
injunctive relief is not moot because che bridge has already been
built. Given our decision on the standing issue, we do not need
to address this issue. Still, we recognize that Plaintiffs filed
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction prior to the bridge's construction while Mclntyre's
Motion to Dismiss was being considered. Because Plaintiffs took
active measures to prevent the construction of the bridge and
because we have the authority to restore the status quo by
ordering the bridge removed, Plaintiffs' appeal on that issue is
not moot. See Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946) ("It has
long been established that where a defendant with notice in an
injunction proceeding completed the acts sought to be enjoined
the court may by mandatory injunction restore the status quo.").
Moreover, we note that after Plaintiffs filed their appeal,
Mclntyre moved this court to dismiss based on grounds of mootness
and we denied that motion.
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any harm to their property is too speculative because it is
contingent on unknown future events. Accordingly, we affirm.

JudffrfM. Billings , Judge
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I CONCUR:

THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting):
^18 I respectfully dissent. Although I do not disagree with the
majority's treatment of standing law as it applies to this case,
I believe that the district court acted prematurely in
determining a lack of standing at the motion to dismiss stage.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges an increased risk of substantial
harm to their property as a result of Mclntyre's bridge, and in
my opinion, that is all that is necessary to survive a motion to
dismiss.
Hl9 nl [Sltanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be
satisfied1 before a court may entertain a controversy between two
parties," Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, % 12, 154 P.3d 808
(alteration in original) (quoting Washington County Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, \ 6 n.2, 82 P.3d 1125) .
However, even though standing is a prerequisite to a court
hearing a matter, that does not always mean that standing can be
easily resolved early in the proceedings. Indeed, standing
issues may present questions of fact that need to be resolved
through the ordinary adversarial process. Cf. Morgan, 2003 UT
58, | 23 ("Whether the Conservancy District advanced sufficient
evidence to establish that its water rights would be enhanced by
any forfeiture of the CPB's rights is a question of fact."
(emphasis added)). In this case, both the degree and likelihood
of harm alleged by Plaintiffs constitute such questions of fact.
f20 "'When determining whether a trial court properly granted a
motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to

20070474-CA

8

the non-moving party. ,,f Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, U 2
n.l, 79 P.3d 974 (quoting Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, f 2, 20
P.3d 895). Thus, the only question we should be considering on
appeal is whether Plaintiffs' complaint alleges sufficient harm
to confer standing, not whether that harm actually exists. I
believe that the complaint clearly meets this requirement. The
complaint alleges that Mclntyre's bridge will cause "immediate
and irreparable harm," "increase the risk of flooding in the
surrounding areas," and "cause significant erosion and damage to
the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge"
if that flooding occurs. Taking these allegations as true, there
is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs have alleged
individualized harm sufficient to confer standing in this matter.
^21 Of course, Plaintiffs still have to establish their alleged
facts in order for the district court to ultimately have
jurisdiction to consider their complaint. But, that is a matter
for trial, or perhaps summary judgment.1 Cf. Utah Chapter of
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ^ 28 n.3, 148
P.3d 960 (describing the procedures employed to determine*
standing in Morgan, 2003 UT 58, including a trial at which both
sides were permitted to present expert witnesses). It should not
have been resolved against Plaintiffs upon a motion to dismiss.
Counsel argued as much at the hearing on Mclntyre's motion:
[B]ased on the allegations, Your Honor, at
this point, we would respectfully urge that
1. Arguably, the district court converted Mclntyre's motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by considering
materials outside of the complaint. See, e.g., Salmon v. Davis
County, 916 P.2d 890, 897 (Utah 1996) (u'[L]abels do not control,
[and] where the trial court, in effect, properly treats such a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment nut erroneously
characterizes its action as a ruling on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the ruling will be reviewed as if it
had been a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.'" (citation
omitted)). The majority opinion does not address this aspect of
the district court's decision, and I will not either. I do note,
however, that if we were to treat this as a summary judgment I
would still be inclined to reverse the district court based on
Plaintiffs1 request to be allowed to "flush in the facts." See,
e.g. , Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^1 12,
104 P.3d 1226 (stating that a motion to dismiss "shall be
converted into one for summary judgment if fmatters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court? and all
parties receive 'reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.'" (emphasis added)
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b))).
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the plaintiffs ought to at least have an
opportunity to flush in the facts. Mr.
Mclntyre ought to have the opportunity to get
an engineering report and to see if there are
disputes of the fact. And if so, then have a
hearing on that issue. And then, Your Hdnor,
then it would be ripe for this court to
determine, are you an aggrieved party, or are
you not an aggrieved party?
The procedure suggested by Plaintiffs1 counsel would have
provided an appropriate method of resolving the standing issue,
although the trial court may have appropriately decided to
proceed along another path.
^[22 Mclntyre! s bridge may or may not present the risk of harm
alleged by Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs did allege that the
bridge will increase the risk of significant damage to their
property, and that is sufficient, in my opinion, to survive a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In granting the motion,
the district court improperly weighed the degree of risk alleged
by Plaintiffs when it should have simply accepted the allegation
of increased risk as true.2 In my opinion, this was error by the
district court, and I would reverse the dismissal order and
remand this matter for further proceedings. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

£^Zs4 77.

William A. Thorne Jr.
Associate Presiding Judge

2. To the extent that Plaintiffs1 complaint lacks clarity as to
the degree of risk that it is asserting, I believe that it is
reasonable to infer that they are alleging a substantial risk
sufficient to confer standing in this matter. Plaintiffs are
entitled to such reasonable inferences when facing a motion to
dismiss. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, \ 2 n.l, 79 P.3d
974.
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A ttomeysfor Petitioners/Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE BROWN, MARILYN BROWN,
JOSEPH SORENSON, and KATHLEEN
SORENSON, individuals, '
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AND AGENCY ACTION
AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF

v.
THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
JERRY D. OLDS, in his capacity as the Utah
State Engineer, and JAMES A. McINTYRE,
an individual,

Judge:

\\H^?&\

civil NO. ryp(VY2ftVZn

Respondents/Defendants.

Petitioners/Plaintiffs Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Brown, Joseph Sorenson, and Kathleen
Sorenson, "Plaintiffs," by and through counsel undersigned, hereby Petition this Court for
judicial review of final, informal, adjudicative administrative proceedings as described below
and for a complaint against Respondents/Defendants hereby alleges and complains as follows:
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PARTIES
1.

Lawrence Brown is an individual residing at 510 East 5600 South, Murray, Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Marilyn Brown is an individual residing at 510 East 5600 Souths Murray, Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Joseph Sorenson is an individual residing at 5741 South Ridge Creek Road,

Murray, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

Kathleen Sorenson is an individual residing at 5741 South Ridge Creek Road,

Murray, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

The respondent agency is the Division of Water Rights ("Division") of the

Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah, with a mailing address of 1594 West
North Temple, Suite 220, P.O. Box 146300, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6480.
6.

Jerry D. Olds is the Utah State Engineer and Director of the Division of Water

Rights of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah, with a mailing address of
1594 West North Temple, Suite 220, P.O. Box 146300, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6480.
7.

James A. Mclntyre, "Mclntyre," is an individual residing at 558 East 5600 South,

Murray, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
JURSDICATION AND VENUE
8.

Jurisdiction is proper in the above-entitled Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3-4(7)(a) and 63-46b-15.
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9.

Venue is appropriate in the above-entitled forum pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§63-46b-15.
BMXSROmm
10.

AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

This is an action which seeks review of an administrative dfecisidirb Fthe Division

approving Mclntyre's application for the construction of a bridge over the Little Cottonwood
Creek located in an area between homes owned by the Plaintiffs. The proposed bridge would
span an area which is environmentally fragile and which has been the site of significant flooding
as recently as 1984. Shetdd'fhe proposed bridge be allowed to be constructed, the construction
will cause immediate and irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs and their property.
11.

On August 21, 2006, the Division received an application for the construction of a

bridge across Little Cottonwood Creek submitted by Mclntyre. See August 21, 2006 Application
Number: 06-57-29SA from Mclntyre, attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
12.

If constructed, the proposed bridge would be placed between the home currently

owned and occupied by Plaintiffs Lawrence and Marilyn Brown and the home currently owned
and occupied by Plaintiffs Joseph and Kathleen Sorenson.
13.

In response to the application, on September 20, 2006, Plaintiffs submitted,

through counsel, an Objection to Mclntyre's Application to Alter a Natural Stream.

See

September 20, 2006 letter, attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
14.

On October 11, 2006, the Division approved Defendant Mclntyre's application

for Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA, effectively approving the
construction of a bridge over Little Cottonwood Creek located at approximately 558 East 5600
South in Salt Lake County. See October 11, 2006 Letter from the Division, attached hereto as
Exhibit "C."
3
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15.

On October 31, 2006, and in accordance with the requirements provided in Utah

Code Annotated §63-46b-13 and Utah Administrative Code Rule R655-6-17, the Plaintiffs
submitted a Request for Reconsideration of the Division's approval- of .Defendant Mclntyre's
application for, Steam Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA. -See October 31, 2006
letter from Plaintiffs, attached hereto as Exhibit "D."
16.

Thereafter, On November 17, 2006, the Division issued a letter to Plaintiffs in

which the Division denied Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration and upheld its decision to
approve Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA. See November 17, 2006 letter
from the Division, attached hereto as Exhibit "E." This is the final agency action to be reviewed.
17.

Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain de novo judicial review of this final agency action

in these informal proceedings in accordance with Chapter 46b of Title 63 of the Utah Code in
that Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies, judicial review is not expressly
prohibited by statute, and Plaintiffs have filed this petition within 30 days after the date that the
order constituting the final agency action was issued, as time is calculated under Rule 6(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
18.

Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the final agency action as Utah Code

Annotated § 73-3-29(4)(b) states in pertinent part that an application to alter or relocate a stream
channel should not be approved if such alteration or relocation will "unreasonably or
unnecessarily adversely affect . . . the natural stream environment; [or] unreasonably or
unnecessarily diminish the natural channel's ability to conduct high flows."
19.

The approved bridge will be in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 73-3-29(4)(b)

in that it will diminish the streams ability to conduct high water flows and thereby increase the

4
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risk and danger of flooding, and in the event flooding occurs, the surroutiding stream
environment will be unnecessarily and adversely affected.
20.

Construction of the proposed bridge and access ramjjs wiir alter the streams

channel, and thereby diminish the natural channels ability to conduct high water flows, heighten
the potential for damming, and thereby increase the risk of flooding in the surrounding areas.
21.

As observed in the Spring of 1984, the location of the bridge is already in an area

of high flood risk. The approved bridge, if constructed, will only enhance the already high flood
risk and danger to the Plaintiffs and other surrounding properties and landowners.
22.

In the event flooding occurs due in whole or in part to the construction of the

proposed bridge, the natural stream environment will be adversely affected and potentially
destroyed by the invading flood waters.
23.

In conjunction with Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs submitted a

Hydrological Evaluation prepared by Secor International. See Secor Report, attached as Exhibit
"F."
24.

The Secor Report demonstrates that the approved bridge design provides for a

one-foot clearance over a high water mark of 526 cubic feet per second. On June 1, 1984, the
flow through Little Cottonwood Creek exceeded 70% of the design water height flow (a water
depth of 6.58 feet, or a water flow of 898 cubic feet per second).

Water flow like that

experienced in 1984 would flow over, and significantly increase the stress on, the bridge as
approved.
25.

The Secor Report also demonstrates that if flows similar to those in 1984 are

experienced in the stream channel (as altered by the construction of the approved bridge), the
erosion could cause the stream banks to overflow and inundate the first level flood plains on both
5
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sides of the stream in the vicinity of the bridge. Such an event will cause significant erosion and
damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge.
26.

Even if an alternative bridge design were considered, the danger of damage to the

Plaintiffs woul,& b& present. The Secor Report detailed that the deck of Jhe proposed bridge
could be raised to 7.5.feett(6.5 feet to address the 1984 water flctws.plus one additional foot of
clearance). However, the access ramps on both sides of the deck would also h^ve to be raised to
meet the adjusted deck height.
27.

While the design change would accommodate increased water flow, the adjusted

access ramps could create a dam for debris caught on the bridge. Because the bridge deck would
be at a higher elevation than the surrounding stream banks, water dammed-up by debris caught
on the deck and access ramps could quickly rise above the stream banks and flood onto the
surrounding first level floodplains.
28.

Plaintiffs have already observed subsidence of their property in areas close to the

Little Cottonwood Creek.
29.

Additionally Plaintiffs ha^re observed foundation and settling cracks on structures

located on the property as a result of the subsidence of the areas near the Little Cottonwood
Creek.
30.

The construction of a bridge in this environmentally fragile area will result in

irreparable harm and damage to the Plaintiffs and their property.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Review and Reversal of Agency Action)
31.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein all other allegations contained in this Petition and

Complaint.
6
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32.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a review by trial de novo of the final agency action, with

the Court making its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, giving no^ deference to the
determinations and proceedings of the Division.
33.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an order of the Court setting aside the a'ggncy action and,

effectively, denying and reversing the Approval of the Application to Alter1a Natural Stream
Channel Number 06-57-29SA issued by the Division.
34.

The Plaintiffs are further entitled to an order of the Court staying the Division's

Approval of the Application to Alter A Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA pending
final resolution by the Court should the Division refuse to order a stay.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief)
35.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein all other allegations contained in this Petition and

Complaint.
36.

Plaintiffs are in danger of suffering immediate and irreparable injury to their

property rights if Defendant Mclntyre constructs a bridge as has been approved by the Division.
37.

If Defendant is nox enjoined from consiructing the proposed bridge and/or

otherwise restrained as set forth herein, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm.
38.

Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain preliminary and permanent injunctive relief which

enjoins and restrains Defendant Mclntyre, his respective agents, employees, successors and
assigns, from constructing a bridge in the area in question.

7
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Blown, Xose^h Sorenson, and
Kathleen Sorenson pray for judgment against the Division and D e f e n d ^ ^fclntjorp on all claims
for relief as follows:
1.

For an order reversing and denying the Approval of the Applipation to Alter a

Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA issued by the Division;
2.

For the entry of a preliminary injunction and permanent inunction which enjoins

and restrains Defendant Mclntyre, his respective agents, employees,, successors and assigns,
from constructing a bridge in the area in question;
3.

For costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this action; and

4.

For such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems

appropriate under the circumstances.
DATED this l<>

day of December, 2006.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Benson L. Hathawayy
Loyal C. Hulme
Peter C. Schofield'
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs Addresses:
Lawrence and Marilyn Brown
510 East 5600 South
Murray, Utah 84107
Joseph and Kathleen Sorenson
5741 South Ridge Creek Road
Murray, Utah 84107
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f*fr. Loyal Huime
Kirton & McConkie
80 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Cursory Hydrologica! Review Report
Proposed Bridge at 558 East 5600 South
Murray, Utah 84017

Dear Mr. Huime:
In accordance with SECOR International Incorporated (SECOR) proposal #09-12-06-01 „**
please accept the foltowing letter report documenting ob$erved hydrofbgical conditions v
directly upstream of 5600 South Street, in and around Little Cottonwood Creek (Creek)*
The purpose of the Cursory Hydrotogical Review was to evaluate flood potential and
possible erosion hazards should the proposed Mclntyre Bridge, as described in the Joint
Permit Application Form, be constructed.
The site and surrounding area was visited on September 14r 2006 by Darin Worden* Sorrier
Hydrologist for SECOR. Approximate property boundaries fn the area were described by
the BrownfamilyThe ar&ayfqs ob$erved from both the Brown and Sorenson properties
along theriver% t J £ ^ o | ^ t h e ^
Creek. Additionally, the Creek's channel was
hikedfromappp^rTOfe^fC^j^r^above the approximate proposed bridge location tolhe
box culvert at S # 0 Sot^Stneet A not to scale Area Map prepared with Hie site walk
observation data in attedhed as Figure 1, Please refer to Figure 1 for a better
understanding of the area descriptions provided below.
Photos with associated descriptions and explanations are attached. The photos were taken
during the abovereferencedsite vfelt The photos am numbered 1 through 8, Photo 1 was
taken on the up stream end of the observed area, and the photos continue in sequence to
Photo 8, taken on the down steam end of the observed area. The approximate photo
locations are presented on Figure 1. Further discussion of the photographs Is presented in
the following sections of this report
General Setting
Little Cottonwood Creek In this area has incised (cut) info aformerdettalc type deposition^
feature (river defe into a former lake) associated wfth a former and much higfifer level of the
Great Salt Lake. The eastern flank of the channel Is for the most part developed with
residential housing. The majority of the homes adjacent to the channel appear to be
Add 3 0 S jt uate( j o n Q^ 1* level ftoodptain approximately 8 to 10 feet above the current stream flow
level.
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The western flank of the observed area Is a combination of a river terrace extending an
approximate 75feetor more above the 1* levelfibodplain,and a small ansa (approraroataJy
2-3 acres in ske) which makes up the only 1* level floodplain area on t h e ^ l f t §&fe<$the
channel. There Is currently no development fii the 1 st level floodplain area on the west side
of the Creek; all current development is located on the nver terrace, approximately 75 feet
(or more) in elevation above the channel.
Based on review of information in the Joint Permit Application Forip -the^proposed* bridge
would be installed at the approximate location presented on Figure 1.
Current *nd Existing Erosion Conditions
The slopefromtheriverterracedown to the channel, a f o n ^ f f ^ ' w ^ s ^ ^ ^ t t i f e ^ t ^ e k , is
veiy steep* With the excepflon of the approximate 2-3 acre * F 1 ^ ^ ^ l f e i p K A area
described above, the river terrace slope is in direct contract with the Creek's channel. The
deltaic deposits which make up the river terrace are primarily fine sand and silt. The steep
slope is quite unstable unless vegetated. Numerous areas of historic rill and gully erosion
were observed. No recent erosion evidence was observed in these areas. Along the down
stream end of the 1** level floodplafn along the west side of the Creek, evidence of recent
and very^acflve erosion was observed. This erosion has B^^^^i^by
flie
Creek's
cbannetmfgrafionlnto the river terrace. The Brown Residence % I§Ba^^difeefiy2ad|adent
to the zone of greatest erosion. The Creek's cutting into ttfe river ts*tfkfe%lthfe*area-has
caused an approximate 20 foot high escarpment Additional^
associated with mature trees directly above and around m ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ o f c r s f e r v e d .
The approximate location of the escarpment and associated alignment of file Creek and trie
Brown Residence Is presented on Rgure 1.
No active erosion along the Creek's eastern flank was observed. The eastern channel
bank has been armored with large rock in all cut-bank sections. A cut-bank sectiorrfealong
the outside stretch of a channel bend where typical erosion takes place, A good example of
channel armoring Is shown In Photo 3. The approximate location of observed channel
armoring Is presented on Rgure 1.
Channel armoring was only observed in two areas along the Creek's western flank. One
armored section, as shown in Photos 1 and 2, was observed approximately 100 yards
upstream from the start of the 1 * level floodplain. The second area of channel amvDring
was observed directly upstream and adjacent to the escarpment described above, and
directly below and adjacent to the down stream end of the 1 *tevelfloodplain.This area is
shown In Photos 4 and 5.
A key point Is that from approximately 100 yards up stream from where the 1 st level flood
plain starts, to the escarpment located at the down stream end of this area, the western
side of the channel has not been armored and is therefore, prone to erosion and
subsequent channel migration. Additionally, it is likely that the channel forces responsible
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forthg e ^ c a p m e i ^ a ^ g ^ ^ a t least partially enhanced by the placemertf of armoring and
channel stabilization efforts along'the eastflankof the Creek.
Potential Influences of the Proposed Bridge
The proposed bridge would be located near the up stream end of the 1** level fioedptein
area located on the west side of the Creek. This approximate location is dam^&am of
any armoring on the west side of the channel. As previously described, Ira fSck of
armoring, on the west side oj4he channel translates to a greater risk of bank erosion and
subsequent channel migration.
Btfffcfcngfftepropos&rffcrfcfgreas dfescff&ecf in the Joint Permft Appifeafforr F&np^ittdi^&afe
a channel constriction ~ a point in foe channel which would, under high flow c^Sltens,
providing an opportunity for typical debris (vegetation/trees, rocks, arid^^r^^tfrer.trrban
material) to catch, backing up the water. !f the stream flow is backed up, inundation of the
1*1 level flood plane on both sides of the stream channel is at significant rfek.
Photos 7 and 8 show settlement cracks along the eastern side of the Brown Residence.
The Brawn Residence ts located on the river terrace, directly above the escarpment along
the Wfcst side of the Greek. WHh the instabilities observed in and around the escarpment,
as wen as the settlement cracks (Photos 7 and 8), further erosion at the escarpment may
increase therisksfor significant property damage. As proposed, construction of the bridge
could Increase the potential for further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the
potential for significant property damage or worse.
R^omm&ncfetions
fn the channel's current condition without construction of the bridge, the non-armored west
bank and most importantly the escarpment area are at significant risk of further einosfan and
potential property damage. Building the-bridge as proposed only Increases the risks for
significant erosion and associated flooding on both sides of utile Cottonwood Creek. It is
SECOR's opinion that a complete engineering study be undertaken to evaluate these risks,
before moving ahead wfSi any stream alteration plans fn (hfs area. Addftfonaffy, SECOR
recommends work begin immediately to stabilize the escarpment and mom completely
understand ft& Brown Residence settlement cracks.
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Please contact the undersigned Tf you require further daHffe^t^oF^^^oiWBMiirfe^R,
Sincerely,
5ECOR International Incorporated

Darin Warden

David D;

Senior Hydrotogtet

Senior a

Attachments:
Copies:

Photos 1 through 8
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290 Conejo Ridge Ava, Suite 200
Thousand Oaks, Q\ 01361
805-230-1266 TEL
605-230-1277 FAX

October 30, 2006
Mr. Loyal Hulme
Kirton & McCfonkte
60 East South Temple, t*800
SaltL^keXt^uMsWl"

RE:

Promse^m^^^p

East 5600 South Street

Hydtofogic Evaluation
SECOR Project No.: 26OT.97G0Q.06.0002
Dear Mr. Hulme:
SECOR J n t e r n a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ (S^JOR) is grateful for the oppprtui
^using
information suppIfe^llrKSe property owner, Jim Mclntyre, in his permit application along
with readily available data on the creek morphology and histonk^i^ws.
SECOR
understands that this bridge has been permitted (No, 06-57-29SA) fefetfee jstate of Utah
Department of Natural Resources Division of Water Rights.
Photos of the Little Cottonwood Creek in the vicinity of the Site show extensive numbers of
cobbles and boulders. Such size rock is typical of high flow conditions. Additionally, bank
cuts indicate that the predominant soii in the area is composed of much finer particles such
as sand and silt Spjis composed of finer particles are more susceptible to erosion. Thus,
should the flows overtop,the banks, overall erosion will likely increase.
The bridge design includes erosion protection in the form of riprap aprons beneath the
respective ends of Ihe bridge based on Sheet 1 of the materials supplied^Jp^ypM
Engineering, Inc. (MCM) for the permit application. The Sheet 1 design details iaf^yde the
following:
1) Two opposing banks of layered loose nprap rock for energy dissipation to minimize
erosion of channel banks,
2) Bank slopes as drawn on Sheet 1 at almost 1:1, which is steep and calculations
herein use a more conservative 2:1 slope (27.5 degree angle);
3) High water mark is taken as 4318.00 feet relative to mean sea level (rms!) and
drawn five feet above the channel bottom,
4) Trapezoidal channels lined with rocks on the banks, but not on the bottom, and
5) Boulder riprap sized nominally at 18 inches throughout to protect the banks.
Calculations were conducted herein to estimate the required size of riprap for Ihe design
provided by MCM. These calculations are based in part on the US Army Corps of
Engineers (ACOE; 1984) Engineer Manual and the US Department of Transportation
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Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. 15, Third Edition (USDOT, 2005), and R§jpe4.
Before conducting calculations, it was noticed that a design ovei^s^fti^^s gn Sheet 1.
The erosion potential is greatest where velocity of flow is greatest, WM\% ^ $fe bottom of
the channel (aka creek bottom). No riprap is shown on the channel bottom. Assuming the
channel bottom is composed of alluvial materials a ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ k ^ t e I ' d b e
included atong the channel bottom from bank to bank, ffftfs, ^ ^ F ^ ^ ^ p ^ w ^ ^ riprap
is sized appropriately for future flows, scour could undermine M&Wg&M ^ ^ ^ bank
and result in its failure.
The calculations herein are very dependent on the assumptions made inJJie,Sh§et 1
design. For instance, channel geometry affects flow rate, flow rate affe©ts Millar stress,
shear stress affects appropriate rock size selection, rock size affects ^annt^geometry^ etc.
Thus, it is not the intent of these calculations to derive an appfopfe^elf^rdesfga The
intent is to evaluate whether the specified riprap size of 18 iricftesffs ai|Mc^^fEft dAhdring
the banks, and the channel bottom if such was property included in the design.

Overview of Calculations
The hydrologic evaluation applied here uses simplified flow dynamics. Hydrologic
parameters used include flow rate, channel geometry, channel slope, and shear stress.
Flow velocity and depth of water vary depending on channel bed gepinetiy, slope, and
roughness. These are in part functions of rock size and shapfe/ i$£p^s$|£& conditions
affect the loose riprap lining the channel as larger shear stresses requrre^^^Srripfap.
A design flow rate is not assumed, though once the calculations are complete, the resultant
flows are compared to historic flows between gauging Stations Crestwood (#239) and 300
West (approximately 6 miles northwest of Crestwood). The Site is located approximately Vz
of the way between these two stream flow gauging stations. InitiaNferations to derive flows
and velocities for creek stages of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 feet were calculated using Manning's
Equation assuming a trapezoidal cross-section.
Manning's Equation
The most widely used equation to describe a channel's average velocity is Manning's
empirical equation:

n
Where:
V= average velocity (ft/sec);
/c= 1.49 (when Manning's equation is expressed in English units);
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ri = Manning's roughness coefficient (unitless);
R = hydraulic radius of the flow (ft); and
S = c h a n i ^ ^ ^ ^ j ^ r ^ o r e rigorously, energy slope) (fl/ft).
The hydraulic ra**s&te ittei$red as the flow cross-sectional area
perimeter. T h e 4 # ^ r a t ^ ^ detained by multiplying the average fto#
section area.

igpfte

^ss-

For a trapezoidal cross-section:

Where:
V=

n

-R2/3SU2

P

And b is the channel base width, T\s the top of channel width, y is flow depth, and zs and z2
are horizontal widths of opposite banks (see graphic below). The Froude number equation
is:

F = F-

\(g*A'COs0)

Where:
^ = tan"1(5)

Cross-Section of Channel

Channel Side View
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Roughness Coefficient
The selection of an appropriate value for Manning's roughne§s ^ | ^ ^ | M ^ ^ p ^ based
on observation and experidfece. Manning's n values v^ry^^ft^^^^^^^P%fe"1bhanneI
b e d * a n d ^ ^ , a s ^ ^ ^ a m o u n t of vegetation growth in t h 0 ^ f e i ^ | ^ * ^ f e w S h few
depth. §infp f^heF-fteWs would require larger riprap wfoHb | ^ | ^ f t | p ^ ® l ^ m t o ^ s n
values, calculations herein used larger n values for deeper flow ctep#rs (Tables 1mt&2%

Channel Slope
The channel slope fe not linear over the approximately 300 yards surveyed up and
downstream of the Site. Therefore, an average slope was used based on elevations at the
respective ends of the surveyed creek reach. This resulted in an average slope of 0.QQQ26
fi/ft, which is relatively gentle. This single slope value was used here for the loose riprap
size calculations.
Velocities and Flow Rates
Flow rate (Q) of water in a channel is governed by depth of water, hydraulic gradient,
channel geometry, and roughness coefficient This relationship takes into account
principles of conservation of linear momentum, which take into apcgynt variations in
momentum related to shear stress- The results are calculations ^oj^mjtetg^'fy and flow
rate. Derivation of these values for creek flow depths were specified at 1,2,3, \ and 5 feet
(Table 2). Velocities calculated were 2.80 to 4.04 feet per second (ft/sec> for 1 and 5 foot
flow depths, respectively. Flows were 50 to 526 cubic feet per second (fr/sec) for 1 and 5
foot flow depths, respectively.
Historic annual peak flow data at the two gauging stations mentioned above are as high as
898 ft3/sec on June 1,1984. This flow is 70% higher than the flow of 526 ffifeec derived for
a water depth of 5 feet Since the historic data span an interval of less than 25 years, it is
possible that flows could.even -be -higher in a 100-year flood scenario. Indeed, in order to
obtain a flow of 898 f^Iseo using Manning's equation, the depth of water would have to be
6.58 feet, which is above the bottom of the bridge. Thus, debris in the flow would catch on
the structure.
Shear Stress
The hydrodynamic force created by water flowing in a channel causes a shear stress on the
channel bottom and banks. The bed material resists this shear stress by a trgcfive force,
Tractive force theory states that the flow-induced shear stress shouJd-npkprodiice a force
greater than the tractive resisting force of the bed materiaL ThaAPpfesibJe ©^critical shear
stress (r p ) in a channel defines the force required to initiate movemegfcofrttie channel bed
or lining material (e.g., riprap erosion).
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Shear stress in a channel is unevenly distributed over its wetted spface. The J3|||e^ drear
stress occurs parallel to the bed gradient at maximum flow depth (i.e., creek bettBm) and
will change in proportion to changes in either of these parameters. Because of the uneven
distribution of shear stress, channel design should be based on shear stress at maximum
flow depth as is represented by the following relationship. The permissible shepr stess (r p
in units of lb/ft2) for a straight channel occurs on the channel bed at nfaximuroJ(tep4h, and
can be computed as follows:

Where,
Vp = pemri&sitte vfefotife^t^cuiated from Manning's equation^of flow)*
n = Manning's coefficient;
7 = unit weight of water (62.4 lb/ft3);
d = maximum depth of flow (ft);
a = unit conversion constant (1.49); and
R = hydraulic radius (cross-section area over perimeter length, A/P; ft).
SolvingaManningUequationfor depth of flow, the maximum shear stress can be calculated.
Flow around bends also creates secondary currents, which impose higher shear stresses
on the channel sides and bottom compared to straight reaches. The maxfrnum^shear stress
in a bend is a fariltforpof^the^fetio &>f channel curvature to bottom width. T h ^ j ^ d shear
stress can be computed using the following relationship:
Tb ~ Kb T p

Where,
r b = bend shear stress (lb/ft2)
Kb = ratio of channel bend to bottom shear stress, a function of FVB
Re = radius to the centerline of the channel (ft)
B = bottom width of the channel (ft)
r p - maxim&fn^fefiirsfslbfe shear stress (lb/ft2)
For the Site, the^ bends were considered sufficiently large that Kb was at its constant
minimal value. Tfius^bend shear stress will only be slightly larger than straight channel
shear stress in the calculations herein.
Bed Material (Loose Riprap) Size
The permissible shear stress for non-cohesive soils is a function of mean diameter of the
channel material. In this application, bed material in contact with flow will be riprap of
boulder dimensions. For large riprap, the permissible shear stress is given by the following
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equation:

Where*
TP -rk^demmsMe
shear stress* (lb/ft2)
F*» S C H R f f f ^ e t e r (0.047, dimensionless)
7 S = ^ H ^ ^ i # i l t b n e (165.4 lb/ft3);
D50 = mean riprap size (ft)
Solving the equation for stone size, we get
D5O = T P / ( F . ( 7 5

-

7))

Where the chanme^i^ak^ja torn, the riprap size is caicufetad3usgig&^4epd shear stress
(r b ) instead of the permissible shear stress (r p ).
D5o = T b /(F-(7 s - 7))
For trapezoidal channels lined with gravel or riprap, haying ^ s j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f r^than 3
horizontal to 1 vertical (>3:1). side slope stability must also b^c6rjsM^3- " i l l s analysis is
performed by comparing the tractive force ratio between side "slopes and charmer bottom
(K2) with the ratio of shear stresses exerted on the channel sitie^aa^iboftom (Kt). The
required rock size for the side slopes is found using the following equation:
(Deojsides = FCj / K2 (Dsojbottom

The tractive force ratio, K2 can also be calculated using the following equation;
K2 = sqrt (1 - sin20 / sin2<J))
Where.
6 = angle of side slope (degrees) and
cp =s angle of repose (degrees) of the rock.
Summary
The design specifications submitted by MCM calculate to a design riprap that is equivalent
to the side sizes as called out on Sheet 1 (18 inches). However, Sheet 1 does not specify
bottom riprap, of any size. Bottom riprap should be included that is a mean diameter of 10
inches. These calculations apply for a flow equivalent to that of the maximum observed
over the last 25 years. There is no evidence that this flow represents a 100-yqar event.
Such an event could result in substantially larger flows, in which case these riprap sizes are
insufficient to resist erosion.
While the Sheet 1 specifications are over-designed for the specified flgw^ it is prudent
practice to place anchor rock along the up gradient and down gradient edges of a loose
riprap surface. Anchor rocks are somewhat larger than the design size. The Sheet 1
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design shows no such rode Additionally, to strengthen loose riprap, it is common practice
to place smaller rock (e.gM cobbles) m the interstices of the riprap as keys to lock the rock
matrix. No mentfon of Ms is made in the application materials.
Given ihe one foot clearance of the bridge over tffe desl^r^fc^water mark fSBH #^spcflow
rate), the observed-flow of more than 70% over the ^esfgn^a|%ftejght flew f l ^ i ^ s e c on
June 1,1984), and the known entrapment of trees \h high fto^ys^lAe ^M^mmmd Creek,
it is very likely that this bridge would catch debris and $fe Overtopped, wftfeh would
significantly increase siress on the bridge and increase erosion potential in the area.
Additionally, the calculated 6.58 foot water depth at the 898 ff/sec flow rate, using the
channel geometry created'by construction of the bridge, would overtop existing banks in the
area and begin to inundate the first level floodplain on both sides of Little Cottonwood
Creek.
An alternative to constructing the bridge as approved would be to raise the deck to allow a
total of 7.5 feet of water flow depth (6.5 feet as calculated for the 898 ftVsec flow rate plus 1
additional foot of free board) to pass under the bridge. This design change would require
slcles
raising the ^^^^fg^B&JS^
°^ ^ e c°ttonwood^Creek an equal height This
would solve t h e ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e d with passing the 898 ff/sec flow under the bridge;
however, the access ramus'then create a dam whereby if the bridge catches debris or
trees, a greater volume of water can be backed up behind the bridge. The bridge deck
would be at an elevation higher than the surrounding stream banks and backed up water
would pour over the stream banks onto the first level floodplain on both sides of the Creek.
In this scenario, raising the height of the bridge deck may actually increase the flooding
potential to a greater degree, when compared to constructing the bridge as approved.
In conclusion, the approved design for permit No. 06-57-29SA is inadequate to address
erosion and would further enhance erosion and flooding potential in the vicinity of the
bridge. Using either bridge design as described above increases the risks to the home
owners in the area.
Please call us with any questions you may have regarding this report at (805)230-1266
x282, or (801)327-7814.
Sincerely,
SECOR International Incorporated

ffY
James "Jay" MacPherson, Ph.D., P.E.
Senior Engineer

Darin Worden
Senior Hydrologist
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Tafete 1. Melntyre Permit No. 06-57-29SA

Example Manning's Equation Calculation
o||ofiChannd

Chaaael Side yiew

0-Tan~H&)
http://\Aww.!mnoengxom/manning.htrn
Data:
Slope
Base
Bank Slope
Unit conversion
Manning Coeff
Depth of ^ t e r

S~
b=
z=
k=
n=

0.00926
16 feet
2
1.49
0.047
1 feet

(foldfifatfflffsfe
Channel surface width
Wetted Perimeter
Area
Hydraufic Radius
[Velocity
Flow rate

T=
p=
A=
R=
VQ=

20 feet
20.47214 feet
18sqft
0.879244 feet
2.799842 ft/sec
50.39715 cfs
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Hydraulics Calculations

Slope
S
0.00926
0.00926
0.00926
0.00926
1 0.00926

Base
Width
B
(feet)
16
16
16
16
16 I

Bank
Slope

Manning'*;
Coefficient

Depth of
Water

z

n

d
(feet)
5
4
3
2
1

2
2
2
2
2

0.08
0.08
0.056
0.047
0.047

I

Lineal
Shear
Stress

Flow
Rate

Velocity
V

Q
(ftVsec)
(lb/fft)
526
9.82
6.56
344
3.89
290
1.8S
167
[ 0.51
50

(ft/sec)
4.04
3.59
4.39
4.18
I 2.80

Kb = function of RJB
Re = radius to the centerline of the channel [feet]

Bend Shear Stress
Re

(feel ?
2 » ' ,
2001 '-"
200'
!
1 200
1 200 ' j

Rc/B

Kb

12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5

W

I

Tb
(ll#)
1&.3
6.9
4.1

1

Side slope (degrees)

f,05

!

1,05
1.05
1.05

i

I

1.9

0.5

j

27.5

B ~ bottom width of the channel [feet]

Rock Size Estimates
Base
Width
B
(feet)
16
16
16
16

I

16

Depth
of
Water
d
(feet)
5
4
3
2
1

Lineal
Shear
Stress

Bend Shear Rock Size
Bottom J
Stress

Rock
Size
Bend

B/y

Ki

s
«#4

i

2

(lb/ft )
9.82
6.56
3.89
1.85
0.51

2

(lb/ft )
10 31
6 89
4.08
1,94
0.53

DsQ(bottDtn)

Dfi0{band)

(inches)

(inches)

10
7
4
,1.9

11*
7
4
2

015

0.6'

D60($!rJ6s) J

-7

||tegrees)

(in<|[^) I

I

t

!

3.20
4.00
5.33
8.00
16.00

* IO>50^

*' UW

!- ^0.60
I 0,5k

I; OM

^27#§M R* "3&

27mmmm
$7WJI m 4B^.
I 2M11K *
I 27.5

&71

1

J?
• IP'''

C1JL an
I n n

K2 = V(1 - sln 2 0 / sin 2 cp)

26OT.97000 06 0002

Rock I
Size
Sides j

*^2

" i
5
3

lift I
0,4 I

» irnii .,, . , ,

M i k , a K} / K 2 (D 60 ) bottom
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